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HEGEL AND THE AD-VENTURE OF THE TOTALITY
Jamila M.H. Mascat
Jamila M.H. Mascat Ad-venture of the Totality
The false modesty of understanding does not get around the 
problem of the whole .
M . Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic (1973)
In the 1975 text Is it Simple to be a Marxist in Philosophy? Louis 
Althusser wrote: 
If I may be allowed to be a little provocative, it seems to me that we can 
leave to Hegel the category of totality, and claim for Marx the category 
of the whole. It might be said that this is a verbal quibble, but I do not 
think that this is entirely true. If I preferred to reserve for Marx the cate-
gory of the whole rather than that of the totality, it is because within the 
totality a double temptation is always present: that of considering it as a 
pervasive essence which exhaustively embraces all of its manifestations, 
and — what comes to the same thing — that of discovering in it, as in a 
circle or a sphere (a metaphor which makes us think of Hegel once 
again), a centre which would be its essence.1
While agreeing with Althusser in recognizing that the very notion of 
totality entails such a ‘double temptation’, it is still possible to argue 
that Hegel may have been tempted by something else. What else it could 
be is precisely what this article aims to engage with, by suggesting that 
the Hegelian totality may be interpreted as a speculative construct 
densely charged with temporal implications: it is both one that 
expresses a timely standpoint — the standpoint of its time which is, as 
claimed by Hegel at the end of his Lectures on the History of Philoso-
phy, only ‘for the time being (für jetzt) completed’2 and one that has 
achieved for the philosophies yet to come the irrevocable gain of com-
prehending (begreifen/concipĕre) their time as a totality, assigning to 
thought precisely the task of constituting and re-constituting wholes.
I.
As a preliminary consideration, it is necessary to point out that the 
notion of totality is understood here as that peculiar principle that 
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Hegel mobilized since his early Jena writings in order to refer to the 
very idea of completion and completeness that is essential to any philo-
sophical aim.3 According to Hegel in fact, ‘jede Philosophie ist in sich 
vollendet und hat, wie ein echtes Kunstwerk, die Totalität in sich 
[Every philosophy is complete in itself, and like an authentic work of 
art, carries the totality within itself ].’4 Therefore, as suggested by 
Gwendoline Jarczyk, the idea of totality functions in Hegel’s works as 
the ‘speculative figure’ of the system contemplated from the perspective 
of its totalizing Stimmung.5 Concrete totality, unlike abstract totality as 
formal identity with itself, designates an intricate knot of qualitative 
aspects that cannot be merely reduced to a quantitative connection 
(Zusammenhang) of elements, nor to a simple all-encompassing unity 
(Einheit). Thus, logical totality as a knot and historical totality as a 
plot are the driving schemes of the present reconstruction of the ad-ven-
ture — the coming-to-be — of the Hegelian totality, as a timely achieve-
ment rooted in its own historical contingency, which consists of a pecu-
liar proportion of speculative freedom that entails neither the end of 
speculation nor the end of history but rather hands on to posterity the 
philosophical assignment to comprehend its Zeitgeist. 
 If one considers the theoretical loci where Hegel provided paradig-
matic examples of various degrees of accomplished totalities — namely 
‘Absolute Knowing’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the concept qua 
‘Absolute Idea’ in the Science of Logic, and ‘Absolute Spirit’ in the 
Encyclopaedia — totality appears as characterized by its vocation to 
absoluteness, a sin of hubris that attests not only totality’s claim for 
all-comprehensive extension but also its claim for self-justification and 
presuppositionlessness, or in other words, totality’s aspiration to be 
ab-soluta — etymologically: detached, free from bonds, disengaged, 
not relative to anything else, hence total .
 The undeniable risk at stake in the presence of the Hegelian ‘con-
cept that comprehends itself conceptually, being as the concrete and just 
as absolutely intensive totality’, as stated at the end of the Science of 
Logic,6 is the danger that everything other than speculation (matter, 
time, contingency, history) may end up being reduced to a mere moment 
of thought itself and caught in the yoke of the ‘circle of circles’ of scien-
tific knowledge.7 This aspect cannot be completely denied, and yet it 
cannot be taken as a final verdict. Indeed, despite being some kind of 
whole, Hegel’s totality paradoxically is not all, since it is possible and to 
some extent necessary to recognize that there is more, namely a concep-
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tual overflow that resides precisely in the complex asymmetrical tempo-
ral relations that make the Hegelian totality conceivable.
 First of all, such an intricate plot becomes visible when one looks 
at the processes of totalization letting totality appear in motion, instead 
of approaching totality qua structure as Althusser seemed to frame it. 
Secondly, one needs to supersede a bi-dimensional spatial notion of 
totality in view of a three-dimensional one, at once ‘strong and frag-
ile’,8 where the third dimension would be that of time. And lastly, in 
order to decipher the temporal rhythms that punctuate the paths of log-
ical, historical, as well as philosophical totalization scattered through-
out the system, one should complicate the understanding of the circular 
metaphors often used by Hegel as recalled by Althusser, for whom 
Marx’s ‘edifice’, as a foundation of ‘one or two upper floors’, would 
indeed have been preferable to the Hegelian topography of the ‘circle of 
circles’.9
II.
Althusser’s criticism of Hegel’s conception of totality can be traced 
throughout all his works, starting from his early dissertation, written in 
1947 and entitled Du contenu dans la pensée de G .W .F . Hegel . The 
Hegelian totality, understood here mainly as a historical achievement, 
is analyzed and questioned with the purpose of disclosing the peculiar 
relationship established between its form and content. Countering the 
Marxian and Marxist vulgata according to which in Hegel’s theory it 
would be possible to separate the ‘good’ form from the ‘bad’ content, 
Althusser argued that, given that the form of the Hegelian totality is the 
concept that comprehends reality and existence, such form may be as 
‘bad’ as its content, insofar as in the last instance it is precisely that 
form that does not allow to adopt any other attitude vis à vis the con-
tent than ‘faire bonne contenance au mauvais contenu’ — i.e., ‘to keep 
a certain composure in front of a bad content’.10 Hegel’s totality is thus 
conceived mainly as a form containing a content, and while that form 
for the young Althusser may already have been a defective and dysfunc-
tional one doomed to decay, its content, once it is historically deprived 
of its conceptual truth, becomes merely a ‘corpse in history’, ‘an exis-
tence without concept’, or in other words, a formless content.11 The 
sharpest arguments of Althusser’s critique, however, are probably for-
mulated in the 1975 essay Est-il simple d’être marxiste en philosophie? 
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and in For Marx.12 The first of Althusser’s remarks concerns the prob-
lem of multiplicity, i.e. the problem of phenomena. Hegel would have 
banned the independence (Selbstständigkeit) of phenomena by framing 
totality as a simple unity in which an internal essence exhausts all of its 
manifestations so as to provide material objectivity only with an 
ephemeral and estranged existence.13 A second related issue concerns 
the problem of indifference, which stems, according to Althusser, from 
the fact that the single components of totality, as simple moments that 
are negated as soon as they are affirmed, would remain ‘all equally 
indifferent’ to each other and practically equal to one another in their 
respective inconsistence.14 Lastly, a third objection that summarizes the 
two previous statements claims that Hegel’s totality, in Althusser’s 
words, embodies an ‘expressive totality, in which all the elements are 
total parts, each expressing the internal unity of the totality which is 
only ever, in all its complexity, the objectification-alienation of a simple 
principle’.15 Hegel’s totality would then be a spiritual totality in which 
every element as pars totalis should express the whole, conceived once 
again as a delimited circular structure or a comprehensive sphere whose 
geometry would impede the development of real and concrete complex-
ity.16
 Concerning the first two remarks on the status of the phenomena 
that the Hegelian totality would confine to the role of indifferent and 
inconsistent moments of the whole, one may observe that the movement 
described by Althusser and ascribed by him to Hegel’s conception of 
totality should be more properly referred to the dialectic of the doctrine 
of essence exposed in Book II of the Science of Logic. Here indeed the 
shine (der Schein) appears as ‘essence’s own positing’, and Hegel accu-
rately pointed out that ‘this shine is not something external, something 
other than essence, but it is essence’s own shining’. Since it has no inde-
pendence in itself, ‘it has existence only with reference to another’, and 
‘it is the non-self-subsistent which exists only in its negation’. In other 
words, as Hegel insisted, ‘the being of shine consists solely in the sub-
latedness of being, in being’s nothingness; […] and apart from its noth-
ingness, apart from essence, it does not exist.’17 However, according to 
the exposition of the Science of Logic, such a dynamic, which belongs 
to the early deployment of the doctrine of essence (part II), does not 
concern the unfolding of the subjective logic of the concept (part III), at 
the end of which the totality appears in the shape of the Absolute Idea. 
The concept indeed presupposes as its ground the already achieved 
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actual unity of essence and phenomena, which is reached at the level of 
Wirklichkeit (section 3 of part II), where ‘shapeless essence and unsta-
ble appearance — or subsistence without determination and manifold-
ness without permanence — have their truth’.18 In this sense, Althuss-
er’s observation does not hit the mark.
 The third Althusserian remark about the so-called ‘expressive 
totality’ obliges us to look closer at the significance and functioning of 
the Begriff. What does the concept do? Clearly it does not ‘express’ 
anything. Hegel, on the contrary conceived of the concept predomi-
nantly as internal activity (Tätigkeit) and development (Entwicklung). 
While the dialectic of the essence properly consists in ‘shining in the 
other’ — a move that fundamentally relies on the inessential exteriority 
of the shine — the proper movement of the concept, which ‘possesses as 
such, within it, the beginning of the advance and development’, consists 
in its concrete positing of what is already present in itself and is ‘the 
universal absolute activity’ as self-determination and self-realization of 
its own accomplishment.19 Thus, the temporality of the concept appears 
to be an uncharacteristic form of temporalization that mirrors the 
peculiar texture of the Science of Logic, where the logical and the 
chronological can hardly match and where the logical Anfang (begin-
ning) cannot coincide with the chronological or phenomenal one. 
 Therefore, the time of the concept is neither a continuum (which 
would imply the immutable permanence of an internal principle sup-
posed to remain identical through the whole series of contingent meta-
morphosis) nor a gradual advancement (which would imply a progres-
sive quantitative growth without leaps), since, as Hegel stated in the 
Philosophy of Nature, ‘the old saying, or so-called law, non datur sal-
tus in natura is altogether inadequate to the diremption of the Notion 
[Concept]’.20 Yet the time of the concept is not that of a plain harmonic 
synchrony either. Thus, the temporal deployment of the Begriff must be 
of a different kind, neither synchronic nor serial.
III.
Hegel often recurred to the image of the circle in order to illustrate the 
unfolding of the Absolute, or he referred to the ‘circle of circles’ in order 
to portray his system of science. The preface to the Phenomenology 
provides a remarkable definition of the figure of the Kreis as ‘the circle 
that presupposes its end [Ende] as its goal [Zweck], having its end 
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[Ende] also as its beginning [zum Anfange]; and only by being worked 
out to its end [Ende], is it actual’.21 The final chapter on ‘Absolute 
Knowing’ re-proposes a similar formulation defining the movement of 
the Spirit as ‘the circle that returns [back] into itself, the circle that pre-
supposes its beginning [Anfang] and reaches it only at the end [im 
Ende]’.22 
 Circularity depends here on the paradoxical notion of sich wieder-
herstellende Gleichheit (‘self-restoring sameness’), i.e., the non-original 
and non-immediate unity that characterizes the becoming subject of the 
substance,23 and in this regard the accomplishment of the concept seems 
to be nothing but a return to the beginning. Nevertheless, such circu-
larity does not imply a setback for the speculative task of the Begriff, 
nor an eternal return of the identical, inasmuch as, according to Hegel, 
a circle does not go back to the immediacy of the Anfang; rather, it 
returns to a second degree of immediacy, which is already a result, and 
thus it preserves in itself the process from which it derives. Thus circu-
larity determines a peculiar relation between the end and its beginning, 
which accounts for the temporality sui generis of the concept qua total-
ity and that may be understood according to the logical trope of the 
‘positing of presuppositions’. Slavoj Žižek has explained the trope as 
follows: ‘What Hegel calls “positing the presuppositions” is the mystery 
of how contingency retroactively “sublates” itself into necessity — how, 
through historical repetition, an initially contingent occurrence is 
“transubstantiated” into the expression of a necessity.’24 Žižek has also 
pointed out that ‘the “necessity” of a totality does not preclude its con-
tingent origins and the heterogeneous nature of its constituents’, the lat-
ter being precisely its presuppositions, ‘which are then posited, retroac-
tively totalized, by the emergence of dialectical totality’.25 Therefore, 
retrospection (as the temporal dimension through which presupposi-
tions are actually posited) suggests a way to address the uneven and 
combined temporality of Hegel’s speculative totality. The retroactive 
aspect of totalization whereby the end comes back to its beginning 
without simply returning back to it reveals the temporal overflow gen-
erated by the concept. It appears thus an atypical twist of diachrony 
and synchrony, a knot of not-coinciding correspondences, since within 
Hegel’s systemic articulation, beginning and end can be correspondent 
without being coincident. And one can already point out that if the 
notion of totality in Hegel’s terms implies such a ‘discordance of times’, 
Althusser’s hypothesis of an ‘expressive totality’ turns out to be inap-
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propriate, for it assumes a synchronic harmony that evidently does not 
pertain to the Hegelian concept of totality.
IV.
Interestingly, Althusser in his early dissertation caught a glimpse of the 
temporal character of the Hegelian totality. He defined it as a plenitudo 
temporum, namely ‘not only an attempt to grasp reality, but also the 
act by which truth is fulfilled and accomplished, sich vollzieht’. Fur-
thermore, Althusser described the process of totalization as the achieve-
ment of a whole that ‘fills a void it discloses in the very act of filling 
it’.26 Nevertheless, the scheme of plenitudo temporum so conceived 
recalls a topography made of fullness and void that conceals and anni-
hilates the very temporal texture of Hegel’s totality by imposing a sub-
stantialist reading of it. In fact, what could seem completely incongru-
ous in terms of spatiality may acquire a different meaning once trans-
posed onto a temporal horizon. The wager concerns the real nature of 
the Hegelian totality and its vocation to be both complete and infinite, 
as well as the possibility of liberating Hegel’s philosophy from the dead-
lock of Martin Heidegger’s parousia, allowing us to provide a different 
re-articulation of the relationship between the temporal and the eter-
nal, the logical and the historical.
 A temporal reading may produce relevant changes in the totality’s 
physiognomy with regards to its fundamental and traditionally ascribed 
geometrical trait of circularity. Within a temporal framework, the attri-
butes of comprehensiveness — as the capacity to enclose everything — 
and consummation — the completeness resulting from the accomplish-
ment of totality — need to be understood in the light of temporal fea-
tures such as timeliness and contingency. This is why a temporal 
re-orientation also compels us to re-elaborate the relationship between 
philosophy and its recalcitrant others — to borrow W. Desmond’s 
words — or its allegedly redundant others: time, history, and temporal 
contingency.27
 The concept qua Absolute Idea — i.e., the accomplished totality of 
the Logic — is not in fact the final word of Hegel’s philosophy system. 
It is rather the peak of the Science of Logic, but the Logic does not 
bring the architecture of Hegel’s system to a close. In this sense, the 
Absolute Idea constitutes ‘as final result also the beginning of another 
sphere and science’; and sciences are meant to be fragments ‘each of 
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which has a before and an after — or, more accurately said, has in pos-
session only the before and in its conclusion points to its after’.28 
Through the articulation of the system, history and philosophy con-
stantly chase each other. From the viewpoint of Hegel’s speculation, the 
Philosophy of Spirit, with its whole charge of historical content, unfolds 
after the Logic and the Philosophy of Nature, and the completion of 
‘Absolute Spirit’ that concludes the Geistesphilosophie marks the very 
acme of thought in the Encyclopedia. But then again the ‘Absolute 
Spirit’ of philosophy falls into the History of Philosophy, which in turn 
intertwines with the Philosophy of History. After all, in Hegel’s philos-
ophy, the relation between speculation (what the concept does) and his-
tory (what happens to the concept through time) seems to be far more 
intricate than any categoric statement about the end of history or the 
end of philosophy.
 To this end, Jean Hyppolite argued in Logic and Existence, ‘The 
passage from history to absolute knowledge, from the temporal to the 
eternal [that takes place at § 552 of the Encyclopedia] is Hegelianism’s 
most obscure dialectical synthesis.’29 It is indeed through this transition 
from Objective Spirit to Absolute Spirit that 
the spirit which thinks world history, stripping off at the same time those 
limitations of the several national spirits and its own temporal restric-
tions, lays hold of its concrete universality, and rises to apprehend abso-
lute spirit, as the eternally actual truth in which the contemplative rea-
son enjoys freedom, while the necessity of nature and the necessity of 
history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its 
honour.30
However, the transition from history to speculation is not univocal, and 
speculation is actually confronted with an opposite transition, which is 
even more obscure and embarrassing: the ad-venture of the totality as 
the advent of the Absolute into history. While taking into account the 
mutual interweaving of ‘Absolute Knowing’ and history and their 
mutual sublation, it is at the same time necessary to disentangle this 
reciprocity in order to push the antinomy all the way and follow each 
opposite path, one after the other: on the one side the sublation of his-
tory into the eternity of the Absolute and, on the other side, the subla-
tion of Absolute Knowing into the course of history. 
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V.
Hegel outlined this chiastic path through two over-quoted passages of 
the Preface to the Philosophy of Right that illustrate the significant ten-
sion arising at the very core of the system between what one could call 
the speculative and the historicist instances of Hegel’s thought: ‘For 
what matters’, he wrote, ‘is to recognize in the semblance of the tempo-
ral and transient the substance which is immanent and the eternal 
which is present’; and then he added, ‘Thus philosophy, too, is its own 
time comprehended in thoughts.’31 While the former quote stresses the 
presence of the eternal in time, the latter emphasizes the conceptual 
comprehension (begreifen) of the course of time that happens in history.
 The same kind of tension is echoed on a larger scale throughout all 
of Hegel’s works, but the Phenomenology of Spirit is the context where 
such a tension emerges as a process in the making with particular inci-
siveness, precisely in the last chapter on ‘Absolute Knowing’ . The fol-
lowing quote then matches with the two previous ones: ‘Time is the 
concept itself that is there […]; for this reason, spirit necessarily appears 
in time just so long as it has not grasped its pure concept, i.e. [as long as 
it] has not annulled time.’32 Two opposite aspects are simultaneously 
staged here: on the one hand, the existentiality of the Begriff that testi-
fies to its temporal dimension; and on the other hand, the erasure 
(tilgen) of time that results from the conceptual rise of the Spirit, so as 
to express the antagonistic rapport between time and concept that 
would lead one to think of the Begriff as an intrinsic threat to the flow 
of time. 
 Indeed, in this final chapter of the Phenomenology the relation 
between the temporal and the atemporal appears in the shape of the 
relationship between concept and representation.33 Hegel highlighted 
here that representation and concept (or religion and philosophy) share 
the same content, though expressed in different forms.34 Nevertheless, 
the issue is eventually more intricate, as proved by the fact that, starting 
with the preface to the Phenomenology, Hegel introduced the element 
of the Vorstellung in a way that ostensibly seems to undermine the pos-
sibility of conceiving of any peaceful dwelling between concept and rep-
resentation. Thus, he stated that consciousness normally deals with rep-
resentations, but ‘knowledge, on the other hand, is directed against the 
representation thus formed, [namely] against this [mere] familiarity 
(Bekanntsein)’ that embodies the most proper mark of Vorstellung as 
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an insufficient and improper medium for speculation.35 At a closer look, 
therefore, concept and representation turn out to entail ‘different times 
of thought’, namely a linear and a circular one.36 
 The fate of representation is essentially related to the flow of phe-
nomenal time, and Hegel provided an incisive definition in the Encyclo-
pedia that clearly emphasizes this aspect: representation, he wrote in 
§565, ‘gives independence to the moments of its content and makes 
them into presuppositions with respect to each other and into appear-
ances following each other (aufeinanderfolgenden Erscheinungen)’; 
their relationship is then conceived as ‘interconnected happenings’ (ein 
Zusammenhang des Geschehens).37 Concept, for its part, also seems to 
be unable to avoid its temporal fate, since the highest freedom gained 
by the spirit at the end of the Phenomenology is proved precisely by its 
capacity to reach the peak of Absolute Knowing, re-plunge into phe-
nomenality, and start its journey anew, embodying an ek-static tempo-
ral mode of permanent self-estrangement. Begriff and Vorstellung thus 
identify with different coefficients of temporalization. There is neither a 
correspondence between the serial time of representation and the circu-
lar and totalizing time of the concept, nor even a concordia discors, 
and they remain somehow incommensurable magnitudes that neverthe-
less allow moments of tangency. 
 Confronting the task of the impossible synthesis of the temporal 
and the atemporal, Hegel’s philosophy ends up triggering a short-circuit 
between them, which derives from the fact that Hegelian eternity, as 
Hyppolite meaningfully remarked, ‘is not simply an eternity before 
time, but the mediating thought that presupposes itself absolutely in 
time’,38 in the same way as the logic exists both beyond history — being 
the eternal thought of God before Creation — and inside of it — being 
also the story of its own manifestations into history. Absolute Knowing 
— ‘this last shape of the Spirit’, as Hegel called it in the Phenomenol-
ogy39 — thus combines the linear time of representations and the circu-
lar time of the concept which indeed short-circuits linearity by weaving 
together the multiple layers of the speculative totality: the logical retro-
spection that ‘posits the presuppositions’, the externalization of Spirit 
in nature and history, and its phenomenological recollection (Erin-
nerung), as well as the ‘conceptually comprehending knowledge’ that 
corresponds to the supreme goal of philosophy (das begreifende Wis-
sen).40
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 However, once one assumes that representation stands for the 
manifestation of the phenomena in time, the question that arises con-
cerning the relationship between Vorstellung and Begriff is whether the 
realization of the concept marks an instance of recollection within phe-
nomenal — i.e., temporal — knowledge or the overcoming of it tout 
court, namely the end of time. In other words, how can the concept 
have a history? How can truth (qua eternity) and development (qua his-
torical time) coincide? And how can history be conceptually grasped to 
become a ‘comprehended history (begriffne Geschichte)’ before the end 
of time?41 How can time be the ‘existing concept itself’ (der daseiende 
Begriff selbst)42 and simultaneously be ‘in its concept eternal’ (in ihrem 
Begriffe ewig)?43
VI.
In the attempt to disentangle the dense overlap of logical, chronologi-
cal, and historical temporalities in Hegel’s discourse, it is necessary to 
make a short digression into the hermeneutics of 1930s French Hege-
lianism and its legacy.44
 Along the lines of Alexandre Koyré’s and Alexandre Kojève’s ear-
lier formulations, Jacques Derrida highlighted in Ousia and Gramme: 
Note on a Note on Being and Time the temporal character of Hegel’s 
dialectic, recalling that ‘at each stage of the negation each time that the 
Aufhebung produced the truth of the previous determination, time was 
requisite’ and that ‘negativity in the structure of Aufhebung already 
was time’.45 Elsewhere Derrida remarked that ‘Koyré and Kojève recog-
nized, contrary to Heidegger, the “prevalence” or the “primacy” of the 
future on the present’ in Hegel’s Jena lectures; however, ‘we should also 
not forget that Koyré and Kojève were amongst the first readers of 
Heidegger; [and] they also recognized this influence in their interpreta-
tions of Hegel’.46 What they inherited from Heidegger is precisely a 
peculiar emphasis on the aporetic dimension of the Hegelian concep-
tion of time in which there would be no future, only immutable being. 
Drawing on a famous marginal note of the 1803–04 Jena manuscripts 
on the ‘Philosophy of Nature’, which states that ‘Geist ist zeit’,47 Koyré, 
in his ‘Hegel à Iéna’ (1934) famously stressed the fundamental matrix 
of time that sustains the whole enterprise of the Hegelian dialectic. 
According to Koyré, Hegel’s early conception of time as human time 
coincides with the restlessness (Unruhe) of logical infinity, and it is a 
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negative temporality in which the future embodies the truth of the pres-
ent. From Hegel’s attempt to dialectically reconcile time and eternity 
through the notion of a ‘timeless becoming’ (devenir intemporel) 
derives, according to Koyré, the main paradox of Hegelian philosophy, 
which he synthesized as follows: 
The dialectical character of time alone makes possible a philosophy of 
history, but at the same time the temporal character of the dialectic 
makes it impossible […]. The philosophy of history — and in that 
re spect the philosophy of Hegel as a whole — the system — could only 
be a possibility if history has come to an end, if it has no more future; 
only if time can stop.48
Actually, Koyré did not provide any solution to the paradox he himself 
formulated; he left us with a mere dichotomy that separates Hegel’s 
Jena writings from his later works, positing Absolute Knowing as a 
joint between the authentically unfinished and unforeseeable dimension 
of the Hegelian temporality of the early period and the closure (or the 
elimination of the future) subsequently brought about by the system. 
 Kojève’s reading of Hegel locates itself on the path carved out by 
Koyré, deepening and dramatizing the issue of the system’s closure with 
the well known theme of the ‘end of history’.49 Maintaining the pri-
macy of the future in the economy of human finite temporality and 
emphasizing the negative character of history as the proper domain of 
the Spirit, Kojève imagined the destiny of the world as a post-historical 
and post-human condition from which negativity and the future have 
disappeared once and for all. In this context, Absolute Knowing ends 
up being the last temporal moment, one that preludes to an eternal 
present where mankind is extinguished as much as history because of 
the collapse of the ontological difference between Spirit and Nature. 
From this perspective, Hegel’s System embodies the very last world of 
philosophy to which the later history of philosophy could only provide 
a punctual update (mise à jour), a notion that introduced in the dis-
course of the late Kojève several paradoxical consequences that cannot 
be explored in the present article.50 
 To come full circle, in her book on L’avenir de Hegel, Catherine 
Malabou raised once again the issue of Hegel’s future as central. Her 
work actually tackles multiple questions: the futurity of Hegelian phi-
losophy, our relationship to the future of his work, and of course the 
notion of the future in Hegel, the role it plays within the system. Did 
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Hegel conceive of the future and allow us to do likewise? Or, to chal-
lenge Kojève’s peremptory reading, ‘Can there be any temporality 
which corresponds to this “end of time” except time’s stasis in the con-
gealed form of a perpetual present?’51
 The concept of plasticity helps Malabou focus on Hegel’s future 
not as a simple moment of/in time but rather as an excess. ‘Plasticity 
amounts to displacing the established definition of the future as a 
moment of time’, and to thinking of it as ‘the excess of the future over 
the future’.52 In Malabou’s terms, the future remains undecidable 
because it corresponds to the structure of ‘seeing (what is) coming’ (voir 
venir) as well as to the kind of anticipation that is implicit in the act of 
seeing what is coming without ever seeing it coming, as pointed out by 
Jacques Derrida in his preface to The Future of Hegel.53 Malabou’s 
notion combines ‘the irresolvable doublet of anticipated certainty and 
uncertain expectation, of knowledge properly bound to necessity and 
of the impossibility of knowing the future, of phronetic patience and 
frenetic anxiety’.54
 Confronting Koyré and Kojève on the terrain of the alleged Hege-
lian impasse of the end of time, Malabou has suggested a possible path 
to overcome it: 
The moment of Absolute Knowledge only causes the dialectical suppres-
sion of one certain time, one specific temporality. From this moment on, 
far from closing all horizons, Absolute Knowledge announces in fact a 
new temporality, one born from the synthesis of two temporalities, the 
Greek and the Christian. The moment which dialectically gives rise to 
the two temporalities marks the emergence of a new era of plasticity in 
which subjectivity gives itself the form which at the same time it re -
ceives.55
According to Malabou, ‘Hegel in effect “sublates” aufheben into aufhe-
ben, Aufhebung into Aufhebung.’ Therefore, she has noted, ‘The possi-
bility of a new reading of Absolute Knowledge emerges from this truly 
plastic operation.’56 
VII.
In the context of the Hegelforschung, the notion of plasticity consti-
tutes an innovative contribution that certainly has the merit of restag-
ing (without merely repeating) the classical debate on the topic of 
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Hegel’s conception of time. However, as far as the interpretation devel-
oped here is concerned, Malabou’s fruitful concept of plasticity plays 
only a very limited role: whereas the present reading shares the empha-
sis on the Begriff’s passive activity of giving and receiving form and on 
the twofold nature of Hegel’s complex conception of temporality that 
resumes the Christian and Greek traditions, it displays at least two sig-
nificant elements differing from Malabou’s plastic reading of Hegel. 
Firstly, it is interested in exploring Hegel’s present57 instead of Hegel’s 
future (the present of his philosophy, meaning his philosophy today, as 
well as the tools which his thought provides in order to seize its time as 
its present and, accordingly, our time as our present) with the aim to 
rescue it from the timeless parousia of being that is portrayed by Heideg-
 ger and to understand it rather through the notion of timeliness . Sec-
ondly, it conceives of Absolute Knowing (and Begriff) as a process of 
totalization that entails cuts and interruptions instead of plastic meta-
morphosis, precisely in virtue of the seizing power of conceptual knowl-
edge qua begreifen.
 The notions of limit (Grenze), sacrifice (Aufopferung), externaliza-
tion/release (Entäusserung/Entlassen), and recollection (Erinnerung) 
evoked in the very last paragraphs of the Phenomenology of Spirit offer 
a consistent framework to develop a tentative description of how total-
ity qua Absolute Knowing emerges from the phenomenological flow 
and creates its own historical conjuncture. All these concepts display a 
meaningful in-betweenness, insofar as they describe acts and gestures 
aimed at bringing something to a close but at the same time point to the 
possibility of overcoming the closure, envisioning a beyond, a new 
beginning, or new starting moves.
 At the end of the Phenomenology Hegel wrote that ‘to know one’s 
limit, is to know how to sacrifice oneself’, establishing a strong connec-
tion between Wissen and Aufopfern.58 But what does knowledge sacri-
fice in knowing its own limit as that ‘which cannot simply be included, 
integrated or asserted in knowledge’?59 On the one hand, one could say 
that it actually sacrifices the absoluteness of its Wissen for a knowledge 
that knows that limitedness is constitutive of any knowledge. On the 
other hand, such sacrifice as ‘the full assumption of the instability and 
contingency of the emergence of knowledge itself’60 reinstates the abso-
lute character of Absolutes Wissen.
 The sacrifice of knowledge consists in the ‘eternal externalization’ 
(ewige Entäußerung) of the Spirit’s ‘continuing existence’ (Bestehen) in 
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space and time, whereby the Spirit itself exposes (darstellt) its coming-
to-be-spirit in the form (Form) of a ‘free contingent happening’.61 Thus, 
the act of changing shape — or trans-forming — turns out to be essen-
tial to sacrifice, as Hegel himself underlined by portraying the Spirit’s 
externalization as an Entlassung, namely as a ‘release of itself from the 
form (Form) of its own self’, which ‘is the supreme freedom and assur-
ance of its self-knowledge’.62 
 The term Entlassen sums up several meanings: to let something go, 
to discharge, to dismiss, to fire someone from a job. But most impor-
tantly, as Frank Ruda has observed, ‘It means that there is an act 
involved — this is what the “Ent” of Entlassen suggests, but at the 
same time the “lassen” implies that this act is an act of letting things be 
(as in Heidegger’s term Gelassenheit).’63 Totality — meaning here the 
achievement of Absolute Knowing — realizes itself through this gesture 
of Entlassung as the sacrifice entailed by the comprehension — or the 
embrace — of its own limit. At the same time, totality also compre-
hends itself in another distinct albeit complementary sense, which 
Hegel portrayed with the following words: 
The other side of [spirit’s] coming-to-be, history, is that conscious, self-
mediating coming-to-be — the spirit emptied out into time. […] This 
coming-to-be presents a slow-moving succession of spirits, a gallery of 
images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of spirit, moves thus 
slowly just because the self has to penetrate and digest this entire wealth 
of its substance. As its fulfilment consists in perfectly knowing what it is, 
in knowing its substance, this knowing is its withdrawal into itself in 
which it abandons its outer existence and gives its existential shape over 
to recollection.64
If the spirit knows itself by comprehending its whole path as its sub-
stance, then comprehension designates its In-Sich-Gehen or the Erin-
nerung that sinks the Geist into ‘the night of its self- consciousness’, 
sublates its existence, and makes of its sublated existence ‘a new world, 
and a new shape of spirit’. Thus, the spirit’s recollection does not merely 
recapitulate the past as such but seizes the present enabling novelty and 
the unexpected to appear. Precisely through this double gesture of 
release (entlassen) and seizure (begreifen), the ad-venture of totality 
rehabilitates Hegel’s alleged timeless present and turns it into a timely 
conjuncture determined by a punctual standpoint — the speculative 
standpoint of totality or ‘the standpoint of the present time’.65 This 
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standpoint appears as the result of a certain degree of accomplishment 
of bourgeois modernity that occurred in Hegel’s time, a time perceived 
by the philosopher as a ‘birth-time’ and as a ‘period of transition to a 
new era’.66
 Being a program, a strategy, rather than a content, totality rep-
resents neither a necessary nor an automatic achievement. On the con-
trary, as stated earlier, Absolute Knowing knows the historical contin-
gency of its necessity and the necessity of its contingency.67 The contin-
gent nature of the ad-venture of totality invests the speculative 
movement of the Begriff with a practical twist: totality has to be 
accomplished or realized in the present as the invention and articula-
tion of the sense of the present itself. Within this process, contingency 
— which Hegel described as the ‘unity of possibility and actuality’ 
(diese Einheit der Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit) — enacts the mutual 
conversion (Umschlagen) of the possible and the actual (wirklich).68 
Indeed, contingency, for its restless and contradictory structure, 
expresses not only the simple Dasein of what is there but also the insta-
bility of it being there and the possibility of it being otherwise,69 so as 
to confer totality the contingent freedom of its unexpected com-
ing-to-be. Philosophy’s enterprise of apprehending its time in thoughts 
then does not amount to relativism nor to historicism, but rather to the 
task of enlightening the world as it is in order to bring to light the 
unseen and the unforeseeable, the transient and the permanent, and to 
disclose the constitutive fragility of all beings and events.70 Thereby, 
totality emerges as the light in which — or the standpoint from which 
— Absolute Knowing grasps and exposes the speculative texture of the 
present together with its contingency. And by embracing contingency as 
its own limit, Absolute Knowing reaffirms the status of its absoluteness 
precisely because of its capacity to sacrifice itself and let it go.
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